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Abstract
Generative models are used in a wide range of applications
building on large amounts of contextually rich information.
Due to possible privacy violations of the individuals whose
data is used to train these models, however, publishing or shar-
ing generative models is not always viable. In this paper,
we present a novel technique for privately releasing genera-
tive models and entire high-dimensional datasets produced by
these models. We model the generator distribution of the train-
ing data with a mixture of k generative neural networks. These
are trained together and collectively learn the generator dis-
tribution of a dataset. Data is divided into k clusters, using
a novel differentially private kernel k-means, then each clus-
ter is given to separate generative neural networks, such as
Restricted Boltzmann Machines or Variational Autoencoders,
which are trained only on their own cluster using differen-
tially private gradient descent. We evaluate our approach using
the MNIST dataset, as well as call detail records and transit
datasets, showing that it produces realistic synthetic samples,
which can also be used to accurately compute arbitrary number
of counting queries.
1 Introduction
Generative models represent an emerging area of machine
learning, as recent progress has made it possible to artificially
generate plausible samples of various kinds of data, includ-
ing images, videos, texts, and music. These models are used,
e.g. compression [46], denoising [6], inpainting [58], super-
resolution [30], semi-supervised learning [41], clustering [47],
etc. More specifically, generative models estimate the un-
derlying distribution of a dataset and randomly generate re-
alistic samples according to their estimated distribution. The
real distribution-generating data is described with significantly
fewer parameters than the number of available samples from
this distribution. This “enforced compression” incentives the
model to describe general features of the training data.
Ideally, such generalization should prevent the model from
learning any individual-specific information. However, com-
mon algorithms often fail to provide such privacy guarantees
and overfit on specific training samples by implicitly memo-
rizing them. For example, in model inversion attacks [20], an
adversary can use a trained model to make predictions of unin-
tended (sensitive) attributes used as input to the model. Hence,
∗A shorter version of this paper appeared at the 17th IEEE International
Conference on Data Mining (ICDM 2017). This is the full version, published
in IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering (TKDE).
even if only internal parameters are released, there might still
be significant threats to the privacy of individuals whose data
is used for training.
In this paper, we present a novel approach supporting the
privacy-preserving release of generative models. While previ-
ous work explored the use of differential privacy in different
areas of machine learning, including deep learning [1,36,43],
privacy protection in generative models has not been explored
so far.
Motivation. Generative models play an important role when-
ever entities need to publish their datasets, e.g., aiming to mon-
etize it or allow third parties with the appropriate expertise
to analyze it. For instance, Call Detail Records (CDRs) col-
lected by telecommunication companies are not only useful
to capture interactions between customers, but also to under-
stand their behavior, e.g., for infectious disease spreading or
migration patterns.1 Rather than releasing only specific aggre-
gate statistics, such as certain counting queries or histograms,
one could share an “anonymized” dataset, which replaces the
original data in possibly privacy-sensitive data analytics tasks.
Alas, traditional anonymization models, such as k-anonymity,
are not effective on high dimensional data, providing poor util-
ity with insufficient privacy guarantees [3].
Intuition. A more promising approach is to model the data
generating distribution by training a generative model on the
original data, and only publish the model along with its (dif-
ferentially private) parameters. Provided with this privacy-
preserving model, anybody can generate a synthetic dataset
resembling the original (training) data as much as possible
without violating the strong protection of differential privacy.
The intuition is that generative models have the potential to
automatically learn the general features of a dataset including
complex regularities such as the subtle and valuable correlation
among different attributes.
Overview of the solution. Following this intuition, we pro-
pose a generative model that is a mixture of k generative arti-
ficial neural networks (ANNs). These ANNs are trained to-
gether and collectively learn the generator distribution of a
dataset. The data is first divided into k clusters using a differ-
entially private clustering approach, then each cluster is given
to a separate generative neural network, such as Restricted
Boltzmann Machines (RBM) [21] or Variational Autoencoders
(VAE) [28], which are trained only on their own cluster using
differentially private gradient descent.
Training distinct generative models on different partitions
1See, e.g., http://www.flowminder.org.
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of the dataset has several benefits. First, multiple models can
generate more accurate synthetic samples than a single model
trained on the whole dataset, as each ANN is trained only on
similar data samples. This prevents the mixture model to gen-
erate unrealistic synthetic samples which may arise from the
implausible combination of multiple very different clusters.
This scenario is much more likely when the training is per-
turbed to guarantee differential privacy. Second, each ANN
models a different component of the generator distribution,
and hence learn any specifics of a cluster faster than a sin-
gle model. In other words, a single model would need more
training epochs than a mixture of generative models to achieve
a comparably rich representation of the clusters. As each it-
eration of the learning algorithm requires some perturbation
to guarantee privacy, a mixture model needs less noise which
eventually yields more accurate model parameters.
Privacy Guarantees. Overall, our work builds on the Differ-
ential Privacy (DP) framework, specifically, using the Gaus-
sian mechanism [18]. For clustering, we use a novel differen-
tially private kernel k-means algorithm; kernel k-means [42] is
a non-linear extension of the classical k-means algorithm and
has been shown to be equivalent with most other kernel based
clustering algorithms [16]. We first transform the data into
a low-dimensional space using random Fourier features [38],
and then apply a differentially private version of Lloyd’s al-
gorithm [8] to find the clusters in the data. Random Fourier
features does not only make kernel k-means scalable for large
datasets [15], but, unlike standard k-means [8], require to add
limited amount of noise to guarantee privacy. Finally, when
clusters are created, a generative model is trained on each
cluster using differentially private stochastic gradient descent
(SGD), which is a standard learning technique of many gener-
ative ANNs. Previous work adds constant amount of noise to
the gradient update in each SGD iteration to guarantee differ-
ential privacy., whereas, we add noise to each gradient update
which is tailored to the data.
We prove that our scheme guarantees differential privacy by
using the moment accountant method, proposed in [1], which
allows to quantify the privacy guarantee of the composition of
differentially private mechanisms (e.g., noisy k-means itera-
tions followed by noisy SGD iterations) much more accurately
than previous work [19].
Contributions. In summary, we make several contributions:
1. We propose a novel approach, relying on generative neu-
ral networks, to model the data generating distribution
of various kinds of data. It provides differential pri-
vacy to each individual in the training data, thus, it
can be used to effectively “anonymize” and share large
high-dimensional datasets with any potentially adversar-
ial third party.
2. We design a novel differentially private clustering algo-
rithm, combining kernel k-means with random Fourier
features, which efficiently clusters high-dimensional
large datasets with strong privacy guarantees.
3. We present a Differentially Private Generative Model
(DPGM), where data is first clustered, using the differ-
entially private kernel k-means, and then each cluster
is given to separate generative neural networks, such as
Restricted Boltzmann Machines or Variational Autoen-
coders, which are trained only on their own cluster using
differentially private gradient descent.
4. We improve the differentially private gradient descent al-
gorithm by Abadi et al. [1], using a novel adaptive per-
turbation technique. We adaptively re-compute the mag-
nitude of the noise used to perturb the gradient updates
in each SGD iteration, which can lead to significant accu-
racy improvement of the trained model.
5. We evaluate our approach on the MNIST dataset [29],
a large Call Detail Records (CDR), and a transit dataset
(TRANSIT); we show that our techniques provide realis-
tic synthetic samples which can also be used to accurately
compute arbitrary number of counting queries.
2 Related work
In this section, we review prior work on privacy-preserving
mechanisms applied to data mining, machine learning, and
deep learning.
Private Data Release. The k-anonymity [45] paradigm aims
to protect data by generalizing and suppressing certain iden-
tifying attributes, however, it does not work well on high-
dimensional datasets [3,10]. Therefore, rather than pursu-
ing input sanitization, prior work has proposed techniques
to produce plausible synthetic records with strong privacy
guarantees, e.g., focusing on differentially private release of
data [2,12,14,26,34,35,51]. Alas, these can often support only
the release of succinct data representations, such as histograms
or contingency tables.
Other mechanisms add noise directly to a generative
model [9,32,33,59]. In this paper, we follow this approach,
while, in a first-of-its-kind attempt, focusing on building pri-
vate generative machine learning models based on neural net-
works. Other approaches [7,39,40] generate data records first,
and then attempt to test their privacy guarantees, i.e., decou-
pling the generative model from the privacy mechanism. By
contrast, we attempt to achieve privacy during the training of
the model, thus avoiding eventual high sample rejection rates
due to privacy tests.
Privacy in Deep Learning. Our work builds on the Differ-
ential Privacy (DP) framework, specifically, using the Gaus-
sian mechanism [18]. Due to its generality, DP has served
as a building block in several recent efforts at the intersec-
tion of privacy and machine learning [1,43]. In general, the
majority of privacy-preserving learning schemes focus on con-
vex optimization problems [4,13,52]. Also, training neural
networks typically requires to optimize non-convex objective
functions – as with Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) [11]
and Variational Autoencoder (VAE) [28] – which is usually
done through the application of Stochastic Gradient Descent
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(SGD) with poor theoretical guarantees. Wu et al. [52] intro-
duce a privacy-preserving technique which runs SGD for con-
vex cases for a constant number of iterations and only adds
noise to the final output. By contrast, we introduce a novel dif-
ferentially private SGD algorithm for optimizing general non-
convex loss functions.
Shokri et al. [43] support distributed training of deep learn-
ing networks in a privacy-preserving way. Specifically, their
system relies on the input of independent entities which aim to
collaboratively build a machine learning model without shar-
ing their training data. To this end, they selectively share
subsets of noisy model parameters during training. However,
their approach incurs high levels of privacy loss per entity, i.e.,
the ε parameter is in the order of thousands, using the strong
composition theorem [19]. Abadi et al. [1] introduce an algo-
rithm for non-convex deep learning models with strong differ-
ential privacy guarantees. They propose a privacy accounting
method, called the moments accountant, which guarantees a
tighter bound of the privacy loss for the composition of multi-
ple gaussian mechanisms when compared to the strong compo-
sition theorem [19]. Our method also relies on the moments ac-
countant to measure privacy loss, but we train generative mod-
els (i.e., unsupervised learning) and with an improved gradient
descent, where the noise is carefully adjusted and injected in
each iteration.
Also, Beaulieu et al. [5] apply the noisy gradient descent
from [1] to train the discriminator of a Generative Adversarial
Network [22] under differential privacy. The resulting model
is then used to generate synthetic subjects based on the popu-
lation of clinical trial data. In this paper, we rather use Varia-
tional Autoencoder which is trained with an improved version
of the noisy gradient descent. Also, we apply a private clus-
tering technique on the training data and create multiple gen-
erative models that produce higher-quality synthetic samples
compared to a single model.
Differentially Private k-means has also been studied in prior
work [44], however, aiming to find linearly separable clusters
and add noise which is proportional to the data dimension m
or the L1-norm of data records. By contrast, our private kernel
k-means approach can find even linearly non-separable clus-
ters, and the added noise is independent of d as well as the
norm of data points. Also, we offer a tighter privacy analy-
sis using the moments accountant method from [1]. Kernel
k-means clustering with random Fourier features (RFF) has
already been considered in [15], albeit without any privacy
guarantee. We somewhat combine [15] and [8], applying DP
k-means on Fourier features to ultimately achieve better accu-
racy than [8].
Clustering and Generative Neural Networks. Prior work
has also attempted to combine clustering with deep learning,
though with no privacy guarantees. Some proposals [25,56,60]
jointly train an autoencoder neural network with a clustering
algorithm, and use the internal representation provided by the
autoencoder, i.e., the encoder output, as features for clustering.
A different training method is used in [17,31,54], where au-
toencoders are initially pre-trained, and then fine-tuned using
the cluster assignment loss. Finally, other techniques [24,57]
combine clustering with standard convolutional neural net-
works (CNNs) for representation learning of images.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we review concepts used throughout the rest
of the paper. We use the following notation: I denotes a uni-
verse of items (e.g., set of visited locations, pixels in an image,
etc.), where |I| = m. A dataset D ⊆ 2I is the ensemble of
all items of some set of individuals. A record, which is a non-
empty subset of I, refers to all items of an individual from D
and is represented by a binary vector x of size m.
3.1 Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBM)
A Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) is a bipartite undi-
rected graphical model composed of m visible and n invisible
(or latent) binary random variables denoted by, respectively,
v = (v1, v2, . . . , vm) and h = (h1, h2, . . . , hn). In our case,
visible variables represent the attributes of D and their values
are composed of records from D. Hidden variables capture
the dependencies between different visible variables (i.e., de-
pendencies between the items in I). As the above model is
a Markov random field with strictly positive joint probability
distribution p over the model variables, p can be represented as
a Boltzmann distribution defined as:
p(v,h) =
1
Z
e−E(v,h) (1)
where Z =
∑
v,h e
−E(v,h) is the partition function, E(v,h)
the energy function, i.e., E(v,h) = −∑ni=1∑mj=1 vijhivj −∑m
j=1 bjvj −
∑n
i=1 cihi, with wij being real valued weights
describing the inter-dependency between vj and hi, and bj , ci
real valued bias terms associated with the jth visible and ith
hidden units, respectively. Using matrix notation, E(v,h) =
−v>Wh − b>v − c>h, where W = JwKi,j , c = [c]i, and
b = [b]j . The goal is to approximate the true data generating
distribution with the Boltzmann distribution p, given in Eq. (1).
To this end, we train the RBM model on dataset D to compute
parameters W, c,b.
There are a few algorithms to train RBMs, that approximate
or relate to gradient descent on the log-likelihood of the data.
If θ = (W,b, c), then we want to maximize the likelihood
function L(θ|D) = ∏x∈D p(x|θ) given dataset D, where
x ∈ {0, 1}m is a record from D and p is the Boltzmann dis-
tribution defined in Eq. (1). A numerical approximation, gra-
dient descent, is used where the model parameters θ are itera-
tively updated using D and the gradient of the log-likelihood
function as: θt+1 = θt + η
∂ logL(θt|D)
∂θt
, with η ∈ R+ being
the learning rate. The model parameters are updated until the
log-likelihood converges. In this paper, we employ Persistent
Contrastive Divergence [48].
3.2 Variational Autoencoder (VAE)
A variational autoencoder [28] consists of two neural net-
works (an encoder and a decoder), and a loss function. The en-
coder compresses data into a latent space (z) while the decoder
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reconstructs the data given the hidden representation. Let x
be a random vector of m observed variables, which are either
discrete or continuous. Let z be a random vector of n latent
continuous variables. The probability distribution between x
and z assumes the form pθ(x, z) = pθ(z)pθ(x | z), where
θ indicates that p is parametrized by θ. Also, let qφ(z | x)
be a recognition model whose goal is to approximate the true
and intractable posterior distribution pθ(z | x). We can then
define a lower-bound on the log-likelihood of x as follows:
L(x) = −DKL(qφ(z | x) || pθ(z)) + Eqφ(z|x)[log pθ(x | z)].
The first term pushes qφ(z | x) to be similar to pθ(z) ensuring
that, while training, VAE learns a decoder that, at generation
time, will be able to invert samples from the prior distribution
such they look just like the training data. The second term can
be seen as a form of reconstruction cost, and needs to be ap-
proximated by sampling from qφ(z | x).
In VAEs, we propagate the gradient signal through the sam-
pling process and through qφ(z | x) using the reparametriza-
tion trick. This is done by making z be a deterministic function
of φ and some noise , i.e., z = f(φ, ). For instance, sampling
from a normal distribution can be done like z = µ+σ, where
 ∼ N (0, I). The reparametrization trick can be viewed as
an efficient way of adapting qφ(z | x) to help improve the
reconstruction. We train the Variational AutoEncoder using
stochastic gradient descent to optimize the loss with respect to
the parameters of the encoder and decoder θ and φ.
3.3 Kernel k-means with Random Features
Given a set of samples D = {x1,x2, . . . ,xN}, k-means
linearly separates D into k clusters C1, C2, . . . , Ck (k ≤ N)
so that it aims to minimize the error
∑k
i=1
∑
x∈Ci ||x− ci||22,
where ci =
∑
x∈Ci x/|Ci| is the centroid of cluster Ci. Al-
though this problem is NP-hard, there are efficient heuristic al-
gorithms (such as Lloyd’s algorithm) which iteratively refines
clustering and converge quickly to a local optimum. How-
ever, k-means can provide very inaccurate clustering of lin-
early non-separable data, which are very common in prac-
tice. To overcome this shortcoming, kernel k-means [42] first
maps samples from input space to a higher dimensional fea-
ture space through a non-linear transformation Φ, then applies
standard k-means on {Φ(x1),Φ(x2), . . . ,Φ(xN )}. Hence,
kernel k-means provides linear separators of clusters in fea-
ture space which correspond to non-linear separators in input
space. Kernel k-means iteratively computes ||Φ(x)− c′i||22 for
each sample x to decide which cluster a sample belongs to,
where c′i =
∑
x∈Ci Φ(x)/|Ci|. To do so, the inner product〈Φ(x),Φ(y)〉 must be known for all x,y ∈ D. Since Φ(·)
is hard to explicitly compute due to its large, often infinite di-
mension, the kernel trick is applied; 〈Φ(x),Φ(y)〉 = κ(x,y),
where κ is an easily computable kernel function. Still, this ap-
proach requires evaluating κ for all pairs of samples and store
the results, which is not scalable for large datasets.
To make kernel k-means scalable, the kernel function can be
approximated with low-dimensional explicit feature maps. In
particular, the samples are first mapped to a low-dimensional
Euclidean inner product space using an explicit random fea-
ture map z : Rm → Rd so that 〈Φ(x),Φ(y)〉 ≈ 〈z(x), z(y)〉.
Then, standard k-means is applied on the low-dimensional
mapped samples {z(x1), z(x2), . . . , z(xN )} in Rd to approx-
imate the result of the kernel k-means with implicit feature
map Φ and kernel κ. The approximation error decreases ex-
ponentially fast as d increases, and quite accurate approxi-
mations can be obtained even for relatively small d. In par-
ticular, the approximation error is less than ξ with only d =
O(mξ−2 log ξ−2) dimensions [38]. Explicit nonlinear feature
maps have already been proposed for shift-invariant kernels
(e.g., generalized RBF kernels) [50] as well as polynomial ker-
nels [37] among others.
3.4 Differential Privacy (DP)
Differential Privacy allows a party to privately release a
dataset: using perturbation mechanisms, a function of an input
dataset is modified, so that any information which can discrim-
inate a record from the rest of the dataset is bounded [18].
Definition 1 (Privacy loss). Let A be a privacy mechanism
which assigns a value Range(A) to a dataset D. The privacy
loss of A with datasets D and D′ at output O ∈ Range(A) is
a random variable P(A, D,D′, O) = log Pr[A(D)=O]Pr[A(D′)=O] where
the probability is taken on the randomness of A.
Definition 2 ((, δ)-Differential Privacy [18]). A privacy
mechanism A guarantees (ε, δ)-differential privacy if for any
database D and D′, differing on at most one record, and
for any possible output S ⊆ Range(A), Pr[A(D) ∈
S] ≤ eε × Pr[A(D′) ∈ S] + δ or, equivalently,
PrO∼A(D)[P(A, D,D′, O) > ε] ≤ δ.
This definition guarantees that every output of algorithm A
is almost equally likely (up to ε) on datasets differing in a sin-
gle record except with probability at most δ, preferably smaller
than 1/|D|. Intuitively, this guarantees that an adversary, pro-
vided with the output of A, can draw almost the same con-
clusions about any individual no matter if this individual is in-
cluded in the input of A or not [18].
Differential privacy maintains composition, i.e., if each
of A1, . . . ,Ak is (ε, δ)-DP, then their k-fold adaptive com-
position2 is (kε, kδ)-DP. However, a tighter upper bound
can be derived on the privacy loss of the composite us-
ing a generic Chernoff bound. In particular, it follows
from Markov’s inequality that Pr[P(A, D,D′, O) ≥ ε] ≤
E[exp(λP(A, D,D′, O))]/ exp(λε) for any output O ∈
Range(A) and λ > 0. This implies that A is (ε, δ)-
DP with δ = minλ exp(αA(λ) − λε), where αA(λ) =
maxD,D′ logEO∼A(D)[exp(λP(A, D,D′, O))] is the log of
the moment generating function of the privacy loss.
Theorem 1 (Moments accountant [1]). Let αAi(λ) be
maxD,D′ logEO∼A(D)[exp(λP(A, D,D′, O))] and A1:k the
k-fold adaptive composition of A1,A2, . . . ,Ak. It holds:
1. αA1:k(λ) ≤
∑k
i=1 αAi(λ)
2The output of Ai−1 is used as input to Ai, i.e., their executions are not
necessarily independent except their coin tosses.
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2. A1:k is (ε,minλ exp(
∑k
i=1 αAi(λ) − λε))-differentially
private
where A1,A2, . . . ,Ak use independent coin tosses.
There are a few ways to achieve DP, including the Gaussian
mechanism [18]. A fundamental concept of all of them is the
global sensitivity of a function [18].
Definition 3 (Global Lp-sensitivity). For any function f :
D → Rd, the Lp-sensitivity of f is ∆pf = maxD,D′ ||f(D)−
f(D′)||p, for all D,D′ differing in at most one record, where
|| · ||p denotes the Lp-norm.
Gaussian Mechanism. The Gaussian Mechanism (GM) [18]
consists of adding Gaussian noise to the true output of a func-
tion. In particular, for any function f : D → Rd, GM is de-
fined as G(D) = f(D)+[N1(0,∆2f ·σ), . . . ,Nd(0,∆2f ·σ)],
where Ni(0,∆2f · σ) are i.i.d. normal random variables with
zero mean and variance (∆2f · σ)2.
Lemma 1. αG(λ) = (λ2 + λ)/4σ2
Proof. Let f : D → R be a scalar function, f(D) = f(D′) +
∆1f , where ∆1f = ∆2f , and O = f(D) + x, where x ∼
N (0, σ). Let σˆ = ∆1f · σ Then, it holds:
P(A, D,D′, O) = ln
(
Pr[G(D) = O]
Pr[G(D′) = O]
)
=
= ln
(
Pr[f(D) +N (0, σˆ) = O]
Pr[f(D′) +N (0, σˆ) = O]
)
= ln
(
exp(−x2/2σˆ2)
exp(−(x+ ∆1f)2/2σˆ2)
)
=
= ln
(
exp(−x2/2σˆ2)
exp(−(x+ ∆1f)2/2σˆ2)
)
=
(
∆1f
σˆ
· x
σˆ
)
+
1
2
(
∆1f
σˆ
)2
Since x is drawn from N (0, σˆ), P(A, D,D′, O) follows
a normal distribution with mean (∆1f)2/2σˆ2 and standard
deviation ∆1f/σˆ, whose moment generating function is
exp
(
(λ2 + λ)(∆1f)
2/4σˆ2
)
. The claim follows from the def-
inition of α and σˆ. For the high-dimensional case when
f : D → Rd (d > 1), the proof is similar to that of Theo-
rem A.1 in [18].
Given αG(λ), the exact privacy cost ε (or δ) of the k-fold
adaptive composition of G is computed based on Theorem 1.
4 DPGM: Differentially Private Gener-
ative Model
In this section, we present our Differentially Private Gen-
erative Model (DPGM), which is detailed in Alg. 1 and il-
lustrated in Figure 1. Table 1 summarizes notation and sym-
bols used throughout the paper. The dataset D is first parti-
tioned into k clusters, denoted by Dˆ1, Dˆ2, . . . , Dˆk, which are
in turn used to train k distinct generative models, where the
parameters of the resulting models are denoted, respectively,
by θ1, θ2, . . . , θk. Data samples are similar within a cluster,
thus, generative models simultaneously trained on each parti-
tion converge faster than a single model trained on the whole
dataset D. As θ1, θ2, . . . , θk are learnt using perturbed gradi-
ent descent, they can be released and used to generate synthetic
data using the k generative models.
Our learning approach involves two main steps:
Algorithm 1: DPGM: Differentially Private Generative Model
Input: Dataset: D = {x1, . . . ,xN}, # of custers: k, k-means
iterations: TK, SGD iterations: TS , Noise scales:
σC , σK, σG
1 Cluster data records in D:
{Dˆ1, Dˆ2, . . . , Dˆk} = DPkmeans(k, TK, D, σC , σK)
2 Initialize θ1, θ2, . . . , θk randomly
3 for t ∈ [TS ] do
4 Select (Dˆs, θs) ∈ {(Dˆ1, θ1), . . . , (Dˆk, θk)} with
probability |Dˆs|/|D|
5 Update parameters of model θs:
6 θs = DP-SGD(Dˆs, θs, σC, σG) //see Alg. 4
Output: θ1, θ2, . . . , θk
Symbol Description
x binary vector
D dataset
k number of k-means clusters
TK k-means iterations
Dˆ1, . . . , Dˆk data clusters
θ1, . . . , θk generative models
cˆ1, . . . , cˆk noisy cluster centers
σC , σK, σG noise scales
Cmax max. norm bound
w max. number of discretized norm bounds
κ kernel function
z randomized Fourier feature map
d number of features
Cs clipping threshold
L loss function
η learning rate
L batch size
Table 1: Notation and symbols used throughout the paper.
1. Records in D are clustered in a random feature space us-
ing differentially private kernel k-means (see Section 4.1)
into clusters Dˆ1, Dˆ2, . . . , Dˆk; and
2. A generative model (e.g., RBM [21] or VAE [28]) with
parameter θi is trained on cluster Dˆi (see Section 4.2)
using differentially private gradient descent, where the
training data are composed of the records of Dˆi.
In each SGD iteration (Line 4-6 in Alg. 1), a model θs is chosen
uniformly at random along with corresponding training data
Dˆs, and a single SGD iteration is performed to update θs us-
ing a random sample S of Dˆs with size L (Line 7 in Alg. 1).
The output of our algorithm are the parameters of the trained
generative models, i.e., θ1, θ2, . . . , θk. Finally, these privately
trained k models can be used to generate synthetic records
which resemble the original ones, i.e., preserve their general
characteristics that are not specific to any single individual (as
per ε and δ discussed in Section 5).
4.1 Private kernel k-means
We now discuss our private kernel k-means algorithm, pre-
sented in Alg. 2. It first transforms the data D into a low-
dimensional representation D′ = {z(x1), . . . , z(xN )} using
randomized Fourier feature map z : Rm → Rd [38], and then
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(Alg. 2) ...
Generative ANN 1
(Alg. 4)
...
Data
Generator
Synthetic
dataset
θ1
θ2
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DPGM (Alg. 1)
Cluster 1
Cluster 2
Cluster k
Computing clipping threshold
(Alg. 3)
D
Cs
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Dˆ1
Dˆ2
Dˆk
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Figure 1: Overview of our differentially private generative model (DPGM).
applies standard differentially private k-means [8] on these
low-dimensional features.
Specifically, z : Rm → Rd is defined as:
z(x) =
√
2
d
[cos(〈w1,x〉+ b1), . . . , cos(〈wd,x〉+ bd)] (2)
where each wi ∈ Rm is drawn independently from p(w) =
1
2pi
∫
Rm exp(−j〈w,x〉)κ(w)dx, i.e., p(w) is the Fourier trans-
form of kernel function κ, and bi ∈ R is chosen from [0, 2pi)
uniformly at random. In particular, Bochner’s theorem implies
that p(w) is a valid probability density function, if κ is con-
tinuous, positive-definite, and shift-invariant kernel. Hence,
κ(x,y) = κ(x − y) = ∫Rm exp(j〈w,x − y〉)p(w)dw =
Ew,b[〈
√
2 cos(〈w,x〉 + b),√2 cos(〈w,y〉 + b)〉], where the
expectation is approximated with the empirical mean over d
randomly chosen values of w and b [38].
Standard DP k-means [8] releases the noisy cluster centers
computed iteratively using a noisy variant of Lloyd’s algo-
rithm; in each iteration, gaussian noise with scale
√
2σK is
added to the size of all clusters, and with scale
√
2σKCs to the
sum of all cluster members in each cluster. These noisy values
are used to compute the noisy cluster centers {cˆ1, . . . , cˆk}.3
To determine the scale of the gaussian noise, the L2-sensitivity
of the cluster size and that of the sum of norms must be known
within each cluster. Although the L2-sensitivity of the set
of cluster size is always
√
2 (a single record can change the
size of at most 2 clusters), such a priori bound does not ex-
ist for the L2-norm of the feature vectors in general. Hence,
we need to clip all feature vectors in L2-norm before apply-
ing standard DP k-means, where the clipping threshold Cs
should be set to the average norm of the feature vectors (i.e.,
(1/N)
∑
x∈D ||z(xi)||2) and is approximated by Alg. 3. Re-
placing z(xi) with zˆ(xi) = z(xi)/max (1, ||z(xi)||2/Cs)
guarantees that all feature vectors are kept as long as their norm
is less then Cs, or they are scaled down to have a norm of Cs.
3We initialize clusters centers to random records drawn from publicly avail-
able non-sensitive data generated by the same distribution as the sensitive
data. We only need k representative samples, and such public datasets al-
ready exist for images, location, and medical data.
Algorithm 2: DPkmeans: Private kernel k-means with Random Fourier
Features
Input: Data: D = {x1, . . . ,xN}, Cluster number: k,
Iterations: T , Feature number: d, Kernel function: κ,
Noise scales: σC , σK
1 Compute Features: wi ∼iid p(w) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d, where
p(w) = 1
2pi
∫
Rm exp(−j〈w,x〉)κ(w)dx
2 bi ∼iid U [0, 2pi] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d
3 D′ ← {z(x1), . . . , z(xN )}, where
z(x) =
√
2/d[cos(〈w1,x〉+ b1), . . . , cos(〈wd,x〉+ bd)]
4 Clip Features: Cs ← DPNorm(D′, σC) //see Alg. 3
5 Dˆ′ ← {zˆ(x1), . . . , zˆ(xN )}, where
zˆ(xi) = z(xi)/max (1, ||z(xi)||2/Cs)
6 Initialize cluster centers cˆ1, cˆ2, . . . , cˆk on public data
7 for t ∈ [T ] do
8 for i ∈ [k] do
9 Assign: Dˆi ← {x : argminj ||zˆ(x)− cˆj ||22 = i}
10 Update: nˆi ← |Dˆi|+N (0,
√
2σK)
11 cˆi ← 1/nˆi
(∑
x∈Dˆi zˆ(x) +N (0,
√
2CsσKI)
)
Output: Dˆ1, Dˆ2, . . . , Dˆk
Nevertheless, for kernel functions like the Radial Basis
Function (RBF)4, a small norm boundCs can be used (see The-
orem 2). This bound is constant for any input data and feature
size independently of the width γ of the RBF kernel. Thus, as
opposed to standard k-means [8], our approach can detect lin-
early non-separable clusters, and, used with RBF kernel, add
constant noise to feature vectors independently of their size d.
Theorem 2. If κ(x,y) = exp(−γ||x − y||2), then
E[||z(x)||2] ≤ 1 for any x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and γ, where the ex-
pectation is taken on the randomness of z.
First, we introduce and prove Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Let N (0, σ) be a zero-centered normal random
variable with standard deviation σ. Then:
4If the kernel function is RBF, i.e.,κ(x,y)=exp(−γ||x − y||2), thenp(w)
has zero centered gaussian distribution with standard deviation 2γI.
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1. E[cos(N (0, σ))] = exp(−σ2/2) and
E[sin(N (0, σ))] = 0,
2. E[cos2(N (0, σ))] = (1 + exp(−2σ2))/2 and
E[sin2(N (0, σ))] = (1− exp(−2σ2))/2
Proof of Lemma 2. Let exp(jN (0, σ)) denote a complex ran-
dom variable. It follows from the moment generating function
of N (0, σ) that:
E[exp(jN (0, σ))] = exp((jσ)2/2) = exp(−σ2/2)
which means that:
E[cos(N (0, σ)) + j sin(N (0, σ))] = E[exp(jN (0, σ))]
= exp(−σ2/2)
This implies that E[cos(N (0, σ))] = exp(−σ2/2) and
E[sin(N (0, σ))] = 0 due to the linearity of expectation.
Hence:
E[cos2(N (0, σ))] = E[(1 + cos(2N (0, σ)))/2]
= (1 + exp(−2σ2))/2
and
E[sin2(N (0, σ))] = E[(1 + cos(2N (0, σ)))/2]
= (1− exp(−2σ2))/2
where we used that 2N (0, σ) = N (0, 2σ).
Proof of Theorem 2. If κ(x,y) = exp(−γ||x − y||2), then
p(w) = 12pi
∫
Rm exp(−j〈w,x〉)κ(w)dx has zero centered
gaussian distribution with standard deviation 2γI.
E[||z(x)||2] = E
((2/d) d∑
i=1
cos2(〈N (0, 2γI),x〉+ U [0, 2pi])
) 1
2

≤
√
2
d
(
d∑
i=1
E
[
cos2(〈N (0, 2γI),x〉+ U [0, 2pi])]])
1
2
(by Jensen’s inequality and the linearity of expectation)
≤
√
2
d
(
d∑
i=1
E
[
cos2(〈N (0, 2γI),x〉)/2 + sin2(〈N (0, 2γI),x〉)/2])
1
2
≤
√
1
d
(
d∑
i=1
E
[
cos2(N (0, 2γ
√
||x||1)
]
+ E
[
sin2(N (0, 2γ
√
||x||1)
]) 12
(by Lemma 2)
≤ 1
where, in the second inequality, we used that cos2(a +
b) = cos2(a) cos2(b) − 2 cos(a) sin(a) cos(b) sin(b) +
sin2(a) sin2(b), E[cos(U [0, 2pi])] = E[sin(U [0, 2pi])] = 0,
E[cos2(U [0, 2pi])] = E[sin2(U [0, 2pi])] = 0.5.
Therefore, DP kernel k-means has two main advantages
over standard DP k-means [8]. First, kernel k-means can find
linearly non-separable clusters. Second, if it is used with RBF
kernel, the added noise is independent of the L2-norm of the
data records. As we show in Section 6, this can lead to much
larger clustering accuracy especially for stringent privacy re-
quirements (i.e., for ε < 0.5) even for large dimensional data.
Algorithm 3: DPNorm: Private Approximation of Average Norm
Input: Data: S = {xc1 , . . . ,xc|S|}, Noise scale: σC , Max.
norm bound: Cmax, Max. number of discretized norm
bounds: w
1 Cj ← j · Cmax/w for 0 ≤ j ≤ w
2 Cs ← argmaxj≥1{tj +N (0,
√
2σC)}, where
tj = |{x ∈ S : Cj−1 < ||g(x)||2 ≤ Cj}|
Output: Cs
Algorithm 4: Private Stochastic Gradient Descent
Input: Data: Dˆ, Model parameters: weights and biases θ,
Noise scales: σC , σG , Loss function:
L(θ) = 1|Dˆ|
∑
i L(θ,xci), Learning rate: η, Batch size:
L
1 Sampling: Take a random sample S = {xc1 , . . . ,xc|S|} of Dˆ
with sampling probability q = L/|Dˆ|
2 Compute Gradient: For each xci ∈ S, compute
g(xci)← ∇θL(θ,xci)
3 Clip Gradient: S′ ← {g(xci), . . . ,g(xc|S|)}
4 Cs ← DPNorm(S′, σC) //see Alg. 3
5 gˆ(xci)← g(xci)/max
(
1,
||g(xci )||2
Cs
)
6 Add noise: g˜← 1
L
(∑|S|
i=1 gˆ(xci) +N (0,
√
2σGCsI)
)
7 Descent: θ ← θ − ηg˜
Output: θ
4.2 Private Stochastic Gradient Descent
We now present our private SGD technique, summarized in
Alg. 4, considering a single SGD batch iteration. Our start-
ing point is the work by Abadi et al. [1]: similar to theirs, our
solution provides differential privacy to the training data by
first clipping the norm of the gradient update of each record,
and then perturbing these clipped gradients by the Gaussian
mechanism. However, we achieve better accuracy as the clip-
ping threshold is selected adaptively in each SGD iteration. In
particular, in each SGD iteration, we also (1) compute the gra-
dient of the loss function L on a random subset S of records
(denoted as “batch”) in Line 2 of Alg. 4, (2) clip the L2 norm
of the gradient of each record in S to have a norm at most Cs
(in Line 3), (3) add gaussian noise N (0,√2σGCsI) to the av-
erage of these clipped gradient updates (Line 6), and finally
(4) perform the descent step (Line 7). At the end, the updated
model parameters θ are returned. A complete training epoch
on the whole dataset D consists of (|D|/L) SGD iterations,
which are required to process all records in every cluster on
average. Indeed, each record in a cluster Dˆs is selected with
probability (|Dˆs|/
∑k
i=1 |Dˆi|) × (L/||Dˆs|) = L/|D|, where∑k
i=1 |Dˆi| = |D|. Notice that the L2-sensitivity of
∑
i gˆ(xi)
is
√
2Cs, as the norm of every gˆ(xi) is at most Cs, and one
record can change at most two clusters.
4.3 Adaptive selection of the norm bound
Both our private SGD method (in Line 4 of Alg. 4) and pri-
vate kernel k-means (in Line 4 of Alg. 2) require the differen-
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tially private computation of the average L2-norm in a given
set of records, which is then used as the clipping threshold
Cs in both algorithms. For this purpose, these algorithms in-
voke DPNorm which is detailed in Alg. 3. In fact, our SGD
technique differs from the original private SGD method [1] in
the selection of the norm bound Cs (in Line 3-5 of Alg. 4).
In the original approach [1], Cs is provided as input to the
private SGD and no guideline is given how to compute its
value without violating differential privacy. Moreover, the
selection of the norm bound Cs has a large impact on the
performance of the private SGD in general. If Cs is too
small, there will be slow convergence. Conversely, if it is too
large, unnecessarily large gaussian noise will be introduced
on the gradient update. Intuitively, Cs should be adjusted
so that ||g(xci)||2 ≈ Cs for each record xci . This guaran-
tees that the contribution of xci to g˜ is maximally preserved
with the smallest relative error. Hence, instead of fixing Cs
for the whole training, we aim to compute Cs adaptively for
each batch as Cs = (1/L)
∑
i ||g(xci)||2. This adaptive ap-
proach would ensure fast convergence with small error, and
also adapt to the gradient update of every batch. Indeed, SGD
is iterative, so the gradient update g˜ of a batch/iteration de-
pends on that of the previous batch/iteration, which means that
(1/L)
∑
i ||g(xci)||2 is different for each batch.
In DPNorm (see Alg. 2), the computation of the average
norm in a set S of records is randomized to guarantee pri-
vacy. A naive solution is to add Gaussian noise to this av-
erage, i.e., Cs = (1/|S|)
∑
x∈S ||x||2 + N (0, s · σ′/L),
where s ≥ maxx∈S ||x||2. However, maxx∈S ||x||2 is data-
dependent and can be too large if there are outliers in S. In-
stead, we approximate Cs such that its value is close to the
norm of many records in S, i.e., it is a good approximator of
(1/L)
∑
x∈S ||x||2. In particular, we discretize the domain of
Cs by dividing (0, Cmax) uniformly into w intervals (Line 1
of Alg. 3). Then, we use the Gaussian mechanism (Line 2 of
Alg. 3) to select among the upper bounds Cj = jCmax/w
of these intervals (0 ≤ j ≤ w), which will be the norm
bound Cs for S. Specifically, we build a histogram where bin i
equals the number of records whose gradient norm falls within
(Ci−1, Ci]. Then, the (noisy) mode of this histogram is com-
puted by adding independent gaussian noise N (0,√2σC) to
each count, and selecting the bin which has the greatest noisy
count. Note that the L2-sensitivity of the histogram is always
bounded by
√
2 no matter how large maxx∈S ||x||2 is.
4.4 Synthetic data generation
To generate an accurate synthetic dataset, data generation
should mimic the training process; in order to generate a syn-
thetic sample, a model with parameter θi is first selected ran-
domly with probability 1/|Dˆi|, then a synthetic sample is gen-
erated using the selected model. This process is repeated until
|D| samples are obtained.
The above generation process ensures that low quality mod-
els which were not selected in training are also less likely to
be used for data generation. In particular, though each model
is trained during the same number of epochs on its own cluster
in expectation, there is no guarantee that all k models will pro-
duce identical quality of synthetic samples due to randomiza-
tion. Indeed, a cluster can potentially contain dissimilar sam-
ples, or it may be too small to be selected in Line 4 of Alg. 4
and hence fail to converge.
5 Privacy Analysis
In this section, we present the formal privacy analysis of
DPGM. Recall that DPGM is the composition of private kernel
k-means and private SGD. Let K denote the private kernel k-
means algorithm whose output is the noisy mapped cluster cen-
ters after TK clustering iterations (i.e., K(D) = {cˆ1, . . . , cˆk}).
K is composed of (1) selecting the norm bound using DPNorm
and (2) TK iterations of k-means. Let G1 denote the gaussian
mechanism which selects the norm bound as per Section 4.3. A
single k-means iteration is the 2-fold adaptive composition of
two gaussian mechanisms G2 and G3 (in Line 10-11 of Alg. 2),
where G2 perturbs the cluster size (Line 10), while G3 adds
noise to the sum of Fourier features of the cluster members
(Line 11). The L2-sensitivity of the size of every clusters is√
2, as changing a single record can change the size of at most
two clusters. Similarly, theL2-sensitivity of the sum of Fourier
features of the cluster members is
√
2Cs as it is detailed in Sec-
tion 4.1.
Since K is the TK-fold adaptive composition of TK cluster-
ing iterations, it follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 1:
αK(λ) ≤ TK(αG1(λ) + αG2(λ) + αG3(λ))
≤ TK(λ2 + λ)(1/4σ2C + 1/2σ2K) (3)
Note that if the RBF kernel is used in kernel k-means (i.e.,
κ(x,y) = exp(−γ||x−y||2) in Alg. 2), then αG1(λ) = 0 and
αK(λ) ≤ TK(λ2 + λ)/2σ2K since Cs = 1 is a priori bound on
the L2-norm of every feature vector (cf. Theorem 2).
Let Sk denote the private SGD algorithm whose output
is the noisy model parameters after TS SGD iterations (i.e.,
S(D) = {θ1, . . . , θk}, computed in the last iteration of Alg. 2),
and the input is the cluster centers {cˆ1, . . . , cˆk} provided byK.
At the very beginning, S assigns each record to its closest clus-
ter center in feature space to obtain k non-overlapping training
sets (this is implemented by the last iteration in Alg. 2). Chang-
ing a single record alters at most a single record in at most 2
training sets (clusters), as the modified record can be moved
from one to another training set. Since all training sets are
non-overlapping, each record is selected in an SGD iteration
with probability q = (|Dˆs|/|D|) × (L/||Dˆs|) = L/|D| for
any k. Moreover, each of the k models are trained indepen-
dently, so αSk(λ) ≤ αS1(λ), where S1 denotes the case when
k = 1 (i.e., a single model is trained on the whole dataset D
during TS epochs).
The complete SGD training of S1 (Line 3-6 in Alg. 1) is the
TS -fold adaptive composition of TS SGD iterations, where we
jointly use two perturbation mechanisms G4 and G5 in each it-
eration; G4 selects a batch uniformly at random and computes
the norm bound Cs (Line 4 of Alg. 4) for this batch, then G5
selects the same batch and perturbs its gradient updates with
gaussian noise whose magnitude is calibrated to Cs (Line 6
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of Alg. 4). The composition of these two mechanisms uses
independent source of randomness through different SGD it-
erations, hence we can use Theorem 1 to quantify the overall
privacy. However, within a single iteration, G4 and G5 do not
use independent source of randomness, although both mech-
anisms use independent gaussian noise but select the same
batch S from the dataset. The following theorem computes
αS1(λ), and is a generalization of Theorem 1 when the com-
ponent mechanisms can use dependent source of randomness.
Theorem 3 (General Moments Accountant). Let αAi(λ) be
maxD,D′ logEO∼A(D)[exp(λP(A, D,D′, O))], and A1:k be
the k-fold adaptive composition of A1,A2, . . . ,Ak. Then:
1. αA1:k(λ) ≤
∑k
i=1 jiαAi(λ/ji)
2. A1:k is (ε,minλ exp(
∑k
i=1 ji · αAi(λ/ji)− λε))-DP
for any
∑k
i=1 ji = 1, where ji > 0 and A1,A2, . . . ,Ak can
use dependent coin tosses.
Proof. We adapt the proof of Theorem 2 in [1] to the case
when the composite mechanism A1:k consists of dependent
mechanisms. Here we detail the complete proof for the sake
of clarity.
Let A1:k denote the composition of A1,A2, . . . ,Ak and
O = (O1, O2, . . . , Ok). Recall that, from Definition 2, A1:k is
(ε, δ)-DP, if PrO∼A1:k(D)[P(A1:k, D,D′, O) > ε] ≤ δ. Then:
P(A1:k, D,D′, O)
= log
Pr[A1:k(D) = O]
Pr[A1:k(D′) = O]
= log
k∏
i=1
Pr[Ai(D) = Oi|Ai−1(D) = Oi−1, . . . ,A1(D) = O1]
Pr[Ai(D′) = Oi|Ai−1(D′) = Oi−1, . . . ,A1(D′) = O1]
(by the Chain rule)
=
k∑
i=1
log
Pr[Ai(D) = Oi|Ai−1(D) = Oi−1, . . . ,A1(D) = O1]
Pr[Ai(D′) = Oi|Ai−1(D′) = Oi−1, . . . ,A1(D′) = O1]
=
k∑
i=1
P(Ai, D,D′, Oi) (4)
for any neighboring datasets D and D′. Hence,
αA1:k (λ) = max
D,D′
logEO∼A(D)[exp(λP(A1:k, D,D′, O))]
= max
D,D′
logEO∼A(D)
[
exp
(
λ
k∑
i=1
P(Ai, D,D′, Oi)
)]
(by Eq. (4))
= max
D,D′
logEO∼A(D)
[
k∏
i=1
exp
(
λP(Ai, D,D′, Oi)
)]
≤ max
D,D′
log
k∏
i=1
(
EOi∼Ai(D)
[
exp
(
λP(Ai, D,D′, Oi)/ji
)])ji
(by the generalization of Hölder’s inequality)
≤ max
D,D′
k∑
i=1
ji log
(
EOi∼Ai(D)
[
exp
(
λP(Ai, D,D′, Oi)/ji
)])
≤
k∑
i=1
ji max
D,D′
log
(
EOi∼Ai(D)
[
exp
(
λP(Ai, D,D′, Oi)/ji
)])
≤
k∑
i=1
jiαAi (λ/ji) (5)
where we can apply the generalization of Hölder’s inequal-
ity in the first inequality due to the fact that exp(·) is always
positive. Therefore,
Pr[P(A1:k, D,D′, O) ≥ ε] = Pr[exp(λP(A1:k, D,D′, O)) ≥ exp(λε)]
≤ EO∼A(D)[exp(λP(A1:k, D,D′, O))]/ exp(λε)
(by Markov’s inequality)
≤ exp(αA1:k (λ)− λε) ≤ exp
(
k∑
i=1
jiαAi (λ/ji)− λε
)
(by Eq. (5))
The claim follows from Definition 2.
Therefore, it follows from Theorem 1 and 3 that:
αSk (λ) ≤ αS1(λ)
≤ TS · min
j1,j2∈(0,1):j1+j2=1
(j1αG4(λ/j1) + j2αG5(λ/j2))
(6)
We compute αG4(λ) and αG5(λ) similarly to [1]. That is, let
µ0(x|σ) = g(x|σ) and µ1(x|σ) = (1−q)g(x|σ)+qg(x−1|σ),
where q = L/|D| is the probability that a record is included in
the batch S of an SGD iteration and g(x|σ) = 1√
2piσ2
e−x
2/2σ2 .
Then, it holds:
αG3(λ) = log max(E1(λ, σC), E2(λ, σC))
αG4(λ) = log max(E1(λ, σG), E2(λ, σG))
where
E1(λ, σ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
µ0(x|σ) ·
(
µ0(x|σ)
µ1(x|σ)
)λ
dx
E2(λ, σ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
µ1(x|σ) ·
(
µ1(x|σ)
µ0(x|σ)
)λ
dx
The next theorem immediately follows from Theorem 1 and
Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. Our differentially private generative model
(DPGM) is (minλ (αK(λ) + αSk(λ)− log δ) /λ, δ)-
differentially private for any fixed δ, where αK(λ) and
αSk(λ) are defined in Eq. 3 and 6.
In this paper, we use the convention that δ =
1/|D|, and compute ε numerically. Specifically, ε =
minλ (αK(λ) + αSk(λ)− log δ) /λ is minimized over integer
values of λ, where λ is usually no more than 100 in practice.
The computation of αG3 and αG4 are performed through nu-
merical integration, and it suffices to consider 10 different val-
ues of j1 and j2 in order to have a sufficiently small value of
j1αG3(λ/`1) + j2αG4(λ/`2) in Eq. 6. Therefore, in practice,
given δ, an accurate approximation of ε can be obtained with
negligible overhead.
6 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we report the results of an experimental
evaluation geared to compute the exact privacy guarantees of
DPGM (presented in Alg. 1). We also analyze its performance
in terms of the quality of generated samples as well as count-
ing (linear) queries computed on the synthetic data. Counting
queries provide the basis of many data analysis and learning
algorithms (see [8] for examples). Finally, we measure the ac-
curacy of our private kernel k-means described in Alg. 2.
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Figure 2: ε value as a function of the number of SGD training epochs for MNIST (δ = 10−5, TK = 20)
Dataset |D| |I| = m max ||x||1 avg ||x||1
MNIST 60,000 784 311.69 102.44
CDR 4,427,486 1303 422 11.42
TRANSIT 1,200,000 342 57 5.26
Table 2: The datasets used in our experiments: MNIST (images),
CDR (call detail records), and TRANSIT (transport records).
6.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets. We use three datasets for our evaluations, summa-
rized in Table 2. MNIST is a public image dataset [29], which
includes 28× 28-pixel images of hand-written digits, a total of
60, 000 samples. We vectorize and binarize each image to have
binary data records with sizem = 784. Throughout our exper-
iments, we assume that each of the 60, 000 records originates
from a different person. We also use an anonymized CDR (Call
Detail Record) dataset provided to us by a cell phone operator.
For this dataset, I represents the set of cell towers of the opera-
tor in a large city with |D| = 4, 427, 486 customers. We use a
simplified version of the dataset, which contains the set of vis-
ited cell towers per customer within the administrative region
of the city over 128.1 km2, where the total number of towers is
m = 1, 303. The average number of individuals per tower over
this period was 38, 817 with a standard deviation of 50, 911.
Finally, we experiment with a transit dataset, which we de-
note as TRANSIT in the rest of the paper.5 Due to non-
disclosure agreement, we are unable to provide specific details
about the dataset, however, we can report that the TRANSIT
dataset include the transit history of passengers in the network
(with |D| = 1, 200, 000); here, I represents the set ofm = 342
stations in a public transportation network.
Experimental Settings. For RBM, we set the number of hid-
den units to 200 and the learning rate is 0.01. The biases b
and c are initialized to zeros, while the initial values of the
weights W are randomly chosen from a zero-mean Gaussian
with a standard deviation of 0.01. For VAE, the number of hid-
den units is set to 200 with single layer encoder and decoder,
and a bi-dimensional latent space. We also used the rectifier
5Note that experiments using this dataset do not appear in the ICDM’17 ver-
sion of the paper.
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Figure 3: Clustering accuracy as a function of ε on MNIST (δ =
10−5, TK = 20).
activation function (ReLu) for all neurons and the Adam opti-
mizer [27]. For our purposes, it is enough to compute α(λ) for
λ ≤ 32. We set the number of the private k-means iterations
to 20 and δ = 1/|D|. We also set Cmax = 10, w = 100 (in
Alg. 3), as different values of these parameters do not have a
strong impact on the results.
We implement DPGM with both RBM (in C++) and VAE
(in Python). Experiments are performed on a workstation run-
ning Ubuntu Server 16.04 LTS, with a 3.4 GHz CPU i7-6800K,
32GB RAM, and NVIDIA Titan X GPU card. Source code is
available upon request.
6.2 Results with Image Dataset
Privacy guarantees. We report the privacy loss ε of DPGM
(Alg. 1) in Figure 2 for the MNIST dataset. Recall that ε
is computed from the noise level σC , σK, and σG , the sam-
pling probability q, the number of k-means iterations TK, and
the number of SGD iterations TS using Theorem 4. Figure 2
shows ε depending on the number of SGD training epochs,
where one epoch consists of d1/qe SGD iterations. In Fig-
ure 2a–2c, we fix σC = 4.0, and report the value of ε as a
function of the number of epochs. We note that larger sam-
pling probabilities (q) and more epochs yield larger values of
ε, i.e., worse privacy guarantee. Figure 2b–2c show that larger
values of σK and σG yield stronger privacy guarantees.
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Figure 4: Real MNIST samples and samples generated from DPGM with RBM and VAE after 20 epochs (ε = 1.74, TK = 20). In (c) and (d),
each row contains 8 samples generated from a cluster.
Clustering accuracy. Next, in Figure 3, we compare
the private kernel k-means (Alg. 2) with RBF kernel
with standard DP k-means [8]. We evaluate the unsu-
pervised clustering accuracy (ACC) [55], where ACC =
maxu
|{x:x∈D∧label(x)=u(K(x))}|
|D| , label(x) is the ground-truth
label of sample x6, K(x) is the cluster assignment obtained
by clustering algorithm K, and u is a one-to-one mapping be-
tween cluster assignments and labels. The best mapping can
be obtained using the Hungarian algorithm. To make a fair
comparison, we fix Cs to
√
m = 28 for standard private k-
means without RFF features, and Cs = 1 for private kernel
k-means with RFF features based on Theorem 2 – i.e., we do
not call DPNorm in either of the algorithms. We compute the
clustering accuracy for different values of d depending on σK,
which directly yields the privacy bound ε using Eq. 3 and The-
orem 1. Finally, we plot the average accuracy over 100 runs as
function of ε in Figure 3.7 Private kernel k-means is clearly su-
perior to standard DP k-means, as the difference in clustering
accuracy can be as large as 20%, especially for smaller values
of ε. Shorter RFF features (i.e., smaller d) result in larger ac-
curacy for smaller values of ε, whereas the reverse holds for
larger ε. The reason is that the clustering error is determined
by the trade-off between (1) the perturbation error due to the
Gaussian noise, which is added to the cluster centers in Line 11
of Alg. 2, and (2) the approximation error caused by the low-
dimensional embedding z in Line 3 of Alg. 2. In particular,
the perturbation error increases if ε decreases or d increases.
Indeed, when the distance ||zˆ(x) − cˆj ||22 to each cluster cen-
ter cˆj is computed in Line 9 of Alg. 2, the total perturbation
of this distance value is obtained by aggregating the noise val-
ues on each coordinate of cˆj , and hence the perturbation error
is proportional to the size d of vector cˆj as well as to ε−1.
On the other hand, larger d decreases the approximation error
introduced by z. One can find a good trade-off between the
approximation and the perturbation error by adjusting d and ε
through experiments using publicly available data. For the rest
6For MNIST, these are digits ranging from 0 to 9.
7Standard deviation of accuracy is < 0.05 for all values of ε and d.
of experiments, we set d to 200.
Selecting the optimal number of clusters k for kernel k-
means can be qualitatively and visually done by relying on di-
mensionality reduction algorithms (e.g., t-SNE [49]). To this
end, one can use public data sampled from the same under-
lying distribution, and therefore not requiring to make the pa-
rameter selection step differentially private. For MNIST we set
k = 10, while we select only one cluster for the CDR dataset.
We investigate the effects of different values of k for the transit
dataset.
Synthetic Samples. As training progresses, the synthetic sam-
ples produced by the generative models should resemble the
true samples. To evaluate model quality, we show the syn-
thetic samples obtained at epoch 20 in Figure 4 from a Re-
stricted Boltzmann Machine and a Variational Autoencoder
with k = 10 clusters on MNIST. For this experiment, we set
q = 0.0017 for a final privacy budget ε of 1.74, and performed
TK = 20 clustering iterations before training the generative
neural networks. Overall, the samples generated from VAE
(Fig. 4c) provide better visual quality than the ones generated
from the RBM (Fig. 4d). Note that the samples generated from
the VAE without our private clustering technique (Figure 4b)
have bad visual quality. Finally, we report additional samples
with a multi-layer VAE in Appendix A.
6.3 Results with CDR and transit dataset
We consider counting queries which are specified by a pred-
icate function p : D → {0, 1} and return the number of
users in the dataset which satisfy the given predicate p, i.e.,
Qp(D) =
∑
x∈D p(x). We evaluate the accuracy of counting
queries on a synthetic dataset generated by DPGM from our
call-data-record (CDR) dataset with roughly 4 million users
and the transit dataset with roughly 1 million users (see in Ta-
ble 2). A single query is defined by a subset of tower cells,
and returns the number of users in D who visited these cells.
We compare DPGM with MWEM [23], which is a de facto
standard differentially private mechanism to answer counting
queries.
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Figure 5: Average relative error vs. ε for the CDR dataset (q = 2.2 · 10−5, δ = 4.4 · 10−6)
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Figure 6: Average relative error vs. ε for the transit dataset (q = 10−4, δ = 10−6)
As done in previous work [53], we measure the utility of a
counting query Qp over the sanitized dataset Dˆ by its relative
error w.r.t. the actual result over the raw datasetD. The relative
error of Qp is thus computed as
|Qp(Dˆ)−Qp(D)|
max{Qp(D),s} , where s is a
sanity bound that weight the influence of the queries with small
selectivities. Following the convention, the sanity bound is set
to 0.1% of the dataset size.
First, we examine the relative error of counting queries with
respect to privacy loss ε. 1, 000 counting queries are randomly
generated with different number of tower cells, which we refer
as the length of the query. Each query set is divided into 5 sub-
sets such that the query length of the i-th subset is uniformly
distributed in
[
1, i·max ||x||15
]
and each item is randomly drawn
from universe of items.
Fig. 5 reports the average relative error for each query set.
This shows that our approach clearly outperforms MWEM.
The error of DPGM ranges from 0.017 for 20% query length
to 0.0012 for 100% when ε = 1.0. Weaker privacy guaran-
tee (larger values of ε) lead to slightly smaller errors (Fig. 5b).
By contrast, the error of MWEM8 ranges from 0.11 to 0.05
even for ε = 2. Also note that the synthetic data produced
by DPGM allows the evaluation of arbitrary number of type of
queries, not only linear counting queries.
Finally, Fig. 6 reports the average relative error for the tran-
8After clipping each record to have L1-norm avg||x||1 = 12, the sensitivity
of queries is set to 12, and the iterations of the algorithm is set to 50 [23].
sit dataset with different number of clusters k. While our ap-
proach, whose average relative error ranges from 0.09 to 0.02,
significantly outperforms MWEM, the number of clusters does
not affect the error of counting queries on transit dataset. These
results might be an artifact of the dataset itself. We also report
additional results with a multi-layer VAE for both the CDR and
Transit dataset in Appendix A.
7 Conclusion
This paper presented a first-of-its-kind attempt to build pri-
vate generative machine learning models based on neural net-
works. Specifically, we presented a novel differentially private
generative model (DPGM), relying on a mixture of k genera-
tive neural networks: such models can be used to generate and
share synthetic high-dimensional data with provable privacy.
We evaluated the performance of the model on real datasets,
showing that our approach provides accurate representation of
large datasets with strong privacy guarantees and high utility.
As part of future work, we plan to combine VAE and a Gaus-
sian Mixture model for clustering, similar to [60], albeit with
strong privacy guarantees. The effective privacy-preserving
training of deep neural networks with multiple hidden layers
is also desirable in order to generate more complex data such
as personal photos or various sequential data. Finally, we plan
to pilot deploy our techniques in the wild.
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(a) ε = 1.74 (b) ε = 2.0
Figure 7: Samples generated from a double layer VAE after 20
epochs. Each row contains 8 samples generated from a cluster.
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Figure 8: Average relative error with ε = 1.0 for the CDR and transit
datasets.
A Multi-layer Variational Autoencoder
We now report additional results for a VAE with a double
layer encoder and decoder. In Fig. 7, we show the synthetic
samples obtained at epoch 20 from a VAE with k = 10 clusters
on MNIST.
Then, Fig. 8a reports the average relative error for the CDR
dataset, while Fig. 8b shows the average relative error for the
transit dataset with different number of clusters k.
Overall, we can observe that increasing the number of lay-
ers, and thus the capacity of the VAE, does not lead to better
performances.
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